N.Y.S.D. Case # 83-cv-6346(TPG)

16-3273 Hardy, et al. v. Kaszycki, et al.

## UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

## SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 1 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United 3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 15th day of June, two thousand seventeen. 5 6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, **USDC SDNY** 7 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, **DOCUMENT** 8 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., **ELECTRONICALLY FILED** 9 Circuit Judges. DOC #: 10 DATE FILED: June 15, 2017 11 12 M. GUY HARDY, individually and as a participant in the Local 95 Insurance 13 Trust Fund and the Local 95 Pension 14 Fund, and on behalf of all other 15 persons who are, will be, or have at 16 17 any time since 1/1/80, been participants or beneficiaries in the, 18 19 JOSEPH HARDY, 20 Plaintiffs-Appellees, 21 HARRY J. DIDUCK, HARVEY L. SHERROD, 22 23 Plaintiffs, 24 25 16-3273 -v.-26 27 EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY OF 28 THE UNITED STATES,

1 Defendant-Cross-Claimant-2 Appellee, 3 4 WILLIAM KASZYCKI, TRUMP-EQUITABLE 5 FIFTH AVENUE COMPANY, TRUMP ORGANIZATION, HOUSE WRECKERS UNION 6 LOCAL 95 PENSION FUND, TRUSTEES OF THE 7 8 HOUSE WRECKERS UNION LOCAL 95 INSURANCE TRUST FUND, KASZYCKI & SONS 9 10 CONTRACTORS INC., DONALD J. TRUMP, DBA 11 THE TRUMP ORGANIZATION, JOHN SENYSHYN, 12 Defendants-Cross-Defendants-13 Cross-Claimants-Appellees, 14 15 -v.-16 17 TIME INC., THE REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, 18 19 <u>Intervenors-Appellants</u>. 20 21 22 2.3 KATIE TOWNSEND, The Reporters FOR APPELLANTS: 24 Committee for Freedom of the 25 Press (Bruce D. Brown, on the 26 brief), Washington, D.C. 27 Andrew B. Lachow, Time Inc., New 28 29 York, New York. 30 31 MATTHEW R. MARON, The Trump FOR APPELLEES: 32 Organization, New York, New 33 York. 34 35 Jared E. Blumetti, Lawrence S. 36 Rosen, LaRocca Hornik Rosen 37 Greenberg & Blaha, LLP, New 38 York, New York. 39 40 Appeal from order of the United States District Court 41 for the Southern District of New York (Griesa, J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED 1 AND DECREED that the order of the district court be VACATED 2 3 and **REMANDED**. Intervenors Time, Inc. ("Time") and The Reporters 4 Committee for Freedom of the Press appeal from the order of 5 6 the United States District Court for the Southern District 7 of New York (Griesa, J.) denying their request to unseal 8 several documents on the docket. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural 9 10 history, and the issues presented for review. We vacate the 11 order of the district court and remand so it can balance the 12 presumptions of public access to court documents against countervailing interests. 13 14 In 1983, a member of a demolition-workers union filed a 15 class action against various parties involved in demolishing 16 the Bonwit Teller building, which was torn down to build Trump Tower. In 1998, the class members settled with the 17 18 various defendants, and the district court approved the settlement. The court sealed four documents on its docket 19 20 connected with that settlement: 1) a transcript of an October 26, 1998 conference (dkt. no. 409); 2) a plaintiffs' 21 22 brief filed on November 9, 1998 (dkt. no. 410); 3) a 2.3 district court order approving the settlement dated December 30, 1998 (dkt. no. 411); and 4) another district court order 24

- 1 approving the settlement dated February 9, 1999 (dkt. no.
- 2 412). In 2016, Time and The Reporters Committee for Freedom
- 3 of the Press moved to unseal those four documents. The
- 4 district court denied their motion, and this appeal
- 5 followed.
- Two of the documents the press organizations seek--the
- 7 transcript and the brief--have been destroyed pursuant to
- 8 the Southern District of New York's standard document
- 9 retention policies. We therefore refrain from ruling on the
- 10 unsealing request as it pertains to them. <u>See Independence</u>
- 11 <u>Party of Richmond Cty. v. Graham</u>, 413 F.3d 252, 255-56 (2d
- 12 Cir. 2005).
- 13 The Southern District still has the two sealed court
- orders, however, so we may review the decision on whether
- 15 they should remain sealed. Both the common law and the
- 16 First Amendment create presumptions that certain types of
- documents should be publicly available. <u>Lugosch v. Pyramid</u>
- 18 Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 119-20 (2d Cir. 2006). Both
- 19 apply to the two court orders, but the presumptions of
- 20 access are simply presumptions—they do not automatically
- 21 mean that the documents should be unsealed. We remand this
- 22 case to the district court for a determination as to whether
- 23 countervailing interests overcome the two presumptions.

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          The common law presumption of access attaches to
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     "judicial documents," and judicial documents are those that
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     are "relevant to the performance of the judicial function
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     and useful in the judicial process." Id. at 119. It is
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     settled that the court-authored orders in this case are
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     judicial documents, and that the common law presumption
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     therefore attaches. <u>In re Application of the United States</u>
     for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 2703(D), 707 F.3d
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     283, 290 (4th Cir. 2013) ("[I]t is commonsensical that
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     judicially authored or created documents are judicial
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     records."); EEOC v. Nat'l Children's Ctr., Inc., 98 F.3d
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     1406, 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("A court's decrees, its
     judgments, its orders, are the quintessential business of
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     the public's institutions.").
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          The next analytical step is to determine the strength
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     of the presumption as it applies to these documents.
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     Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 119. We conclude that it is of
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     middling strength. The two documents are closely tied to
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     the exercise of judicial power (they are the exercise of
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     judicial power), but the very strongest presumption is
     reserved in civil cases for documents "used to determine
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     litigants' substantive legal rights." Bernstein v.
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     Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, 814 F.3d 132, 142
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      (2d Cir. 2016).
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          Courts have found that interests such as protection of
     ongoing investigations, safety of witnesses, national
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     security, and trade secrets may be sufficient to defeat the
     presumption. Id. at 143. We leave it to the district court
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     to identify any interest in favor of secrecy sufficient to
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     defeat the presumption that court orders be open to the
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     public.
          The First Amendment also creates a presumption of
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     public access that likewise attaches to court orders.
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     is a long tradition of public access to court orders, Union
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     Oil Co. of Cal. v. Leavell, 220 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir.
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     2000) ("[I]t should go without saying that the judge's
     opinions and orders belong in the public domain."); they are
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     judicial documents, Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 120 ("The courts
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     that have undertaken this type of [First Amendment] inquiry
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     have generally invoked the common law right of access to
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     judicial documents in support of finding a history of
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     openness."); and public access plays a significant role in
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     the judicial approval of class action and derivative
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     settlements. But the First Amendment presumption, like the
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     common law presumption, may be overcome by competing values.
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     <u>Lugosch</u>, 435 F.3d at 120.
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On remand, the district court shall consider whether
any interests can overcome the common law and First
Amendment presumptions of access to the two court orders.
Any decision that the documents should remain sealed must be
supported by "specific, on the record findings" and must
explain why sealing "is essential to preserve higher values
and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest." $\underline{\text{Id.}}$
For the foregoing reasons, we hereby <b>VACATE</b> the order
of the district court and <b>REMAND</b> for further proceedings
consistent with this order.
FOR THE COURT: CATHERINE O'HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK

Catherine SECOND Paul volfe

A True Copy

Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe Clerk

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit